# Quantum Cryptography: Decoy State Protocol

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- ▶ Classical key distribution assumes certain problems are hard.
	- ▶ Shor's Algorithm: can factor large numbers very quickly. Uses:

$$
a^{\varphi(n)} \equiv 1 \pmod{n} \tag{1}
$$

and the Quantum Fourier Transform.

 $\blacktriangleright$  In Quantum key distribution (QKD), the laws of physics provides unconditional security

#### What is a Quantum State

▶ A quantum state is a vector inside a Hilbert space, given by

$$
\alpha \ket{0} + \beta \ket{1} \tag{2}
$$

0 with  $\alpha, \beta \in \mathbb{C}$  and  $|0\rangle, |1\rangle$  form an orthonormal basis.

▶ Measurements are done with respect to a basis. They result is one of the basis vectors:

$$
P(|0\rangle) = |\alpha|^2, \qquad P(|1\rangle) = |\beta|^2 \tag{3}
$$

▶ Another orthonormal base is |+⟩, |−⟩ given by

$$
|+\rangle = \frac{1}{\sqrt{2}}(|0\rangle + |1\rangle), \qquad |-\rangle = \frac{1}{\sqrt{2}}(|0\rangle - |1\rangle)
$$
 (4)

# What is a Quantum State

#### **Basic vectors**

- $\blacktriangleright$   $|0\rangle$  corresponds to  $\updownarrow$  (0 in rectangular basis)
- ▶ |1⟩ corresponds to  $\leftrightarrow$  (1 in rectangular basis)
- $\blacktriangleright$   $\ket{+}$  corresponds to  $\swarrow$  (0 in diagonal basis)
- ▶  $|-\rangle$  corresponds to  $\sqrt{\ }$  (1 in diagonal basis)
- $\blacktriangleright$  Basis choices
	- Rectangular basis:  $\longleftrightarrow$
	- $\blacktriangleright$  Diagonal basis:  $\bigtimes$

#### Theorem

No Cloning Theorem: It is impossible to create an identical copy of a quantum state.

Goal: To share a *one-time pad*, that only Alice and Bob knows about. An *n*-bit key can encrypt and decrypt an *n*-bit message by applying  $XOR$ .

#### Example

If the key is 01001 and the message is 11101 then the encrypted message is 10100. Applying XOR again gives the original message.

## BB84 Protocol: Procedure

1. Alice sends a random key, (for example: 01001) with each bit encoded in a single photon selected from a random basis.

$$
A1_{\text{ice}} \left\{\n \begin{array}{l}\n B_{i+1} & \circ & \circ & \circ & \circ \\
B_{\text{axis}} & + & \times & \times & + \\
B_{\text{hoten}} & \circ & \circ & \circ & \circ \\
\end{array}\n \right.
$$

2. Bob measures each photon, also by randomly selected a basis each time.

$$
B_{ob} \left\{\begin{array}{l} {B} \text{axis}: \quad + \times + + \times \\ {B} \text{hoton}: \quad 1 \text{ with } 1 \text{ with } 1 \end{array}\right.
$$

3. After everything is done, they both communicate what basis they used over a *public channel* and only keep results where basis choice matches.

# BB84 Protocol: Security

▶ To defend against eavesdroppers, Alice can reserve some bits for error-checking.



After all bits have been communicated, Alice tells Bob which bits are for error correcting and they compare inputs/outputs.

▶ If error rate above a certain percentage, terminate immediately.

# BB84 Protocol: Assumptions

- ▶ True random number generators
	- ▶ Existing solutions using quantum RNG
- ▶ Authenticated public channels
- $\blacktriangleright$  Single photon source
	- ▶ Difficult to achieve
	- ▶ Key vulnerability: Photon Number Splitting (PNS) attacks!



### Practical Devices: Weak Coherent Lasers

- $\blacktriangleright$  Each pulse consists of a certain number of photons
- If the average number of photons is  $\mu$ , the probability of actually sending *n* photons follows a *Poisson distribution*,

$$
P_{\mu}(n) = \frac{e^{-\mu}\mu^n}{n!} \tag{5}
$$

Even if  $\mu = 1$ , single photons only occur  $e^{-1} \approx 37\%$  of the time!

▶ Only solution is to make  $\mu$  smaller, but this causes optimal key rate to scale as  $R\sim\eta^2$  where  $\eta$  is the transmittance.

- ▶ Idea: try to estimate the amount of interference by sending out decoy states
- ▶ Common method: Use 2 decoy states where the average photon numbers,  $\nu_1, \nu_2$  are very low
- $\blacktriangleright$  The yield  $Y_i$  is the probability of detecting exactly i photons. Assume Eve has *complete control* over this.
- $\blacktriangleright$  The gain of the *i*-photon state is

$$
Q_i = Y_i P_\mu(i) = Y_i \frac{e^{-\mu} \mu^n}{n!} \tag{6}
$$

 $\triangleright$  The error rate (QBER) of the *i*-photon state is

$$
e_i = \frac{\text{erroneous bits}}{\text{total bits}}\tag{7}
$$

 $A \equiv \begin{pmatrix} 1 & 0 & 0 \\ 0 & 1 & 0 \\ 0 & 0 & 0 \end{pmatrix} \in A \Rightarrow A \equiv \begin{pmatrix} 1 & 0 & 0 \\ 0 & 1 & 0 \\ 0 & 0 & 0 \end{pmatrix} \in A$ 

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Alice also has control over this

 $\blacktriangleright$  The overall gain is given by

$$
Y_0 + 1 - e^{-\eta \mu} = \sum_{i=0}^{\infty} Y_i \frac{\mu^i}{i!} e^{-\mu}
$$
 (8)

 $\blacktriangleright$  The overall QBER is given by

$$
e_0 Y_0 + e_{\text{detector}} (1 - e^{-\eta \mu}) = \sum_{i=0}^{\infty} e_i Y_i \frac{\mu^i}{i!} e^{-\mu}
$$
 (9)

 $\blacktriangleright$  The key rate is dependent on

$$
R \sim Y_1(1 - H_2(e_1)) \tag{10}
$$

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where  $H_2$  is the binary entropy function.

 $\blacktriangleright$  Idea: Bounding  $Y_1, e_1$  given the equations allows us to lower bound R  $\mathbf{A} \equiv \mathbf{A} + \math$ 

Accounting for the decoy states, we have linear constraints

$$
Y_0 + 1 - e^{-\eta \mu} = \sum_{i=0}^{\infty} Y_i \frac{\mu^i}{i!} e^{-\mu}
$$
  

$$
Y_0 + 1 - e^{-\eta \nu_k} = \sum_{i=0}^{\infty} Y_i \frac{\nu_k^i}{i!} e^{-\nu_k}
$$
  

$$
e_0 Y_0 + e_{\text{detector}} (1 - e^{-\eta \mu}) = \sum_{i=0}^{\infty} e_i Y_i \frac{\mu^i}{i!} e^{-\mu}
$$
  

$$
e_0 Y_0 + e_{\text{detector}} (1 - e^{-\eta \nu_k}) = \sum_{i=0}^{\infty} e_i Y_i \frac{\nu_k^i}{i!} e^{-\nu_k}
$$
  

$$
0 \le e_i, Y_i \le 1
$$

to minimize  $Y_1$  and maximize  $e_1$ .

Common to take  $\nu_1 = 0$  and  $\nu_2 = 0.05$ . (vacuum + weak decoy). Optimal intensity is around  $\mu \sim 0.5$ .



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A secure key can be transmitted over 100 km.



 $\left\{ \begin{array}{ccc} 1 & 0 & 0 \\ 0 & 1 & 0 \end{array} \right.$ э  $299$ 14 / 14