# Quantum Cryptography: Decoy State Protocol

QiLin Xue University of Toronto

October 11, 2024

- Classical key distribution assumes certain problems are hard.
  - Shor's Algorithm: can factor large numbers very quickly. Uses:

$$a^{\varphi(n)} \equiv 1 \pmod{n} \tag{1}$$

and the Quantum Fourier Transform.

In Quantum key distribution (QKD), the laws of physics provides unconditional security

#### What is a Quantum State

A quantum state is a vector inside a Hilbert space, given by

$$\alpha \left| \mathbf{0} \right\rangle + \beta \left| \mathbf{1} \right\rangle \tag{2}$$

0 with  $\alpha, \beta \in \mathbb{C}$  and  $|0\rangle, |1\rangle$  form an orthonormal basis.

Measurements are done with respect to a basis. They result is one of the basis vectors:

$$P(|0\rangle) = |\alpha|^2, \qquad P(|1\rangle) = |\beta|^2$$
 (3)

• Another orthonormal base is  $|+\rangle, |-\rangle$  given by

$$|+\rangle = rac{1}{\sqrt{2}}(|0\rangle + |1\rangle), \qquad |-\rangle = rac{1}{\sqrt{2}}(|0\rangle - |1\rangle) \tag{4}$$

# What is a Quantum State

Basic vectors

- $|0\rangle$  corresponds to  $\updownarrow$  (0 in rectangular basis)
- ▶  $|1\rangle$  corresponds to  $_{\leftrightarrow}$  (1 in rectangular basis)
- ▶  $|+\rangle$  corresponds to  $\checkmark$  (0 in diagonal basis)
- $|-\rangle$  corresponds to  $\searrow$  (1 in diagonal basis)
- Basis choices
  - $\blacktriangleright \text{ Rectangular basis: } \longleftrightarrow$
  - Diagonal basis: X

#### Theorem

No Cloning Theorem: It is impossible to create an identical copy of a quantum state.

**Goal:** To share a *one-time pad*, that only Alice and Bob knows about. An *n*-bit key can encrypt and decrypt an *n*-bit message by applying XOR.

#### Example

If the key is 01001 and the message is 11101 then the encrypted message is 10100. Applying XOR again gives the original message.

## BB84 Protocol: Procedure

1. Alice sends a random key, (for example: 01001) with each bit encoded in a single photon selected from a random basis.

Alice 
$$\begin{cases} Bit & 0 & 1 & 0 & 0 \\ Basis & + & \times & + + \\ Photon & 1 & \sqrt{2} & 1 \\ \end{cases}$$

2. Bob measures each photon, also by randomly selected a basis each time.

3. After everything is done, they both communicate what basis they used over a *public channel* and only keep results where basis choice matches.

# BB84 Protocol: Security

To defend against eavesdroppers, Alice can reserve some bits for error-checking.



After all bits have been communicated, Alice tells Bob which bits are for error correcting and they compare inputs/outputs.

If error rate above a certain percentage, terminate immediately.

# BB84 Protocol: Assumptions

- True random number generators
  - Existing solutions using quantum RNG
- Authenticated public channels
- Single photon source
  - Difficult to achieve
  - Key vulnerability: Photon Number Splitting (PNS) attacks!



## Practical Devices: Weak Coherent Lasers

- Each pulse consists of a certain number of photons
- If the average number of photons is μ, the probability of actually sending n photons follows a Poisson distribution,

$$P_{\mu}(n) = \frac{e^{-\mu}\mu^n}{n!} \tag{5}$$

Even if  $\mu = 1$ , single photons only occur  $e^{-1} \approx 37\%$  of the time!

Only solution is to make μ smaller, but this causes optimal key rate to scale as R ~ η<sup>2</sup> where η is the transmittance.

- Idea: try to estimate the amount of interference by sending out decoy states
- Common method: Use 2 decoy states where the average photon numbers, v<sub>1</sub>, v<sub>2</sub> are very low
- The yield Y<sub>i</sub> is the probability of detecting exactly i photons. Assume Eve has complete control over this.
- The gain of the *i*-photon state is

$$Q_{i} = Y_{i}P_{\mu}(i) = Y_{i}\frac{e^{-\mu}\mu^{n}}{n!}$$
(6)

イロト 不得 トイヨト イヨト

The error rate (QBER) of the *i*-photon state is

$$e_i = rac{ ext{erroneous bits}}{ ext{total bits}}$$

Alice also has control over this

(7)

The overall gain is given by

$$Y_0 + 1 - e^{-\eta\mu} = \sum_{i=0}^{\infty} Y_i \frac{\mu^i}{i!} e^{-\mu}$$
 (8)

The overall QBER is given by

$$e_0 Y_0 + e_{detector} (1 - e^{-\eta \mu}) = \sum_{i=0}^{\infty} e_i Y_i \frac{\mu^i}{i!} e^{-\mu}$$
(9)

The key rate is dependent on

$$R \sim Y_1(1 - H_2(e_1))$$
 (10)

where  $H_2$  is the binary entropy function.

Idea: Bounding Y<sub>1</sub>, e<sub>1</sub> given the equations allows us to lower bound R

Accounting for the decoy states, we have linear constraints

$$Y_{0} + 1 - e^{-\eta\mu} = \sum_{i=0}^{\infty} Y_{i} \frac{\mu^{i}}{i!} e^{-\mu}$$
$$Y_{0} + 1 - e^{-\eta\nu_{k}} = \sum_{i=0}^{\infty} Y_{i} \frac{\nu_{k}^{i}}{i!} e^{-\nu_{k}}$$
$$e_{0}Y_{0} + e_{detector}(1 - e^{-\eta\mu}) = \sum_{i=0}^{\infty} e_{i}Y_{i} \frac{\mu^{i}}{i!} e^{-\mu}$$
$$e_{0}Y_{0} + e_{detector}(1 - e^{-\eta\nu_{k}}) = \sum_{i=0}^{\infty} e_{i}Y_{i} \frac{\nu_{k}^{i}}{i!} e^{-\nu_{k}}$$
$$0 \le e_{i}, Y_{i} \le 1$$

to minimize  $Y_1$  and maximize  $e_1$ .

Common to take  $\nu_1 = 0$  and  $\nu_2 = 0.05$ . (vacuum + weak decoy). Optimal intensity is around  $\mu \sim 0.5$ .



A secure key can be transmitted over 100 km.

